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Abstract
Citizens of foreign countries are increasingly using international treaties to bring
claims against the U.S government. As a result, U.S. courts are being asked to determine
whether treaties provide litigants with individually enforceable rights. Although courts
have no consistent approach to it, they often apply the textualist methodology derived
from statutory interpretation in determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually
enforceable rights. Resolution of this issue in favor of individually enforceable rights is
particularly beneficial for human rights and humanitarian law treaties, because without
individually enforceable rights, those treaties are not likely to be enforced.
Instead of using theories of statutory interpretation, I argue that courts should
apply a modified version of the “intent-to-benefit” test derived from contract law in
determining whether a treaty is enforceable by a non-party. Three general grounds
support my agreement. First, the structural similarities between contracts and treaties
(and the correlative differences between statutes and treaties) justify applying the
principles derived from contract interpretation to treaty interpretation. Second, Supreme
Court jurisprudence supports the view that treaties have the effect of statutes, but are
actually contracts. As such, it is appropriate to apply theories of contract interpretation to
understanding treaties. Third, arguments used to justify using textualism for purposes of
interpreting statutes are not relevant to interpreting treaties.
I apply the modified intent-to-benefit test to a case study-- the Sanchez-Llamas
case, in which the Supreme Court decided last term that the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations does not provide individuals with any remedies.
Introduction
Globalization, marked by an increase in trade, migration, and capital flows among
nations, creates opportunities for disputes between national governments and foreign
nationals. International tribunals, however, are typically not receptive to claims brought
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by individual litigants for treaty violations.1 As a result, non-U.S. citizens are
increasingly asserting claims in U.S. courts based on treaty violations.2
Although courts have generally recognized that treaties may give rise to
individually enforceable rights,3 there is no consensus on correct methodology for
determining whether a specific treaty gives rise to such rights. Yet many courts have
increasingly applied the textualist methodology derived from statutory interpretation to
determining whether a treaty gives individuals rights.4 Courts thus look only to the text
of the treaty and typically refuse to use extra-textual sources to inform their decision.5
This methodology essentially creates a presumption against individually enforceable
rights in treaties. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (“Foreign Relations
Restatement”) concurs that “[i]nternational agreements . . . generally do not create private
rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.6

1

See e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 906 (1987) [hereinafter “Foreign Relations
Restatement”] (“International tribunals and other fora are generally not open to claims by private
persons.”).
2
I use the term “treaty” as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 [hereinafter “Treaty Convention”] (“‘Treaty’ means an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.”). My use of “treaty”
excludes “executive agreements,” which may be concluded without the participation of the Senate. See
e.g., United States v. Belmont, et. al., 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (“A treaty signifies ‘a compact made between
two or more independent nations, with a view to the public welfare.’ But an international compact, as this
was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.”) (citing B. Altman & Co. v.
United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912)).
3
See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (enforcing a Yugoslav citizens’ right under U.S.Serbia treaty to inherit personal property located in Oregon); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1947)
(enforcing a German citizens’ right to inherit property a treaty); Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech,
311 U.S. 150, 311 U.S. 150, 161-62 (1940) (enforcing foreign trademark owner’s rights under multilateral
trademark treaty); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) (enforcing Danish citizen’s right under U.S.Denmark treaty to be free of discriminatory taxation); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) (enforcing
U.S.-Japan treaty allowing Japanese citizens to conduct trade); Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336
(1925) (holding that U.S.-China treaty prevented mandatory exclusion of wives and minor children of
Chinese merchants under Immigration Act of 1924); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880)
(enforcing treaty assuring Swiss citizens’ right to inherit property); Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
489 (1824) (enforcing British land owner’s rights under treaty); Soc’y for Propagation of Gospel v. NewHaven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 454 (1823) (same).
4
See See discussion infra Section II.
5
See id.
6
Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 1, at § 907, cmt. a.
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In this article, I argue that a modified version of the “intent-to-benefit” test used
to determine third party rights in contracts should be used to determine whether a treaty
gives rise to individually enforceable rights. Several reasons support this approach.
First, treaties are characteristically more similar to contracts than to statutes, including in
formation, governance, and structure.7 Second, the text and history of the Constitution
lends support to the view that treaties should be interpreted as contracts. 8 Finally,
although textualism may be appropriate in the context of statutory interpretation, it is not
appropriate for purposes of treaty interpretation.9

I apply the modified intent-to-benefit

test I propose to Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a case decided by the Supreme Court last
term in which it missed an important opportunity to clarify a muddy area of the law.10
In Section I, I describe the Court’s march towards textualism in statutory
interpretation. In Section II, I trace the Court’s increasing tendency to apply textualism
to treaty interpretation, particularly to the question of whether a treaty gives rise to
individually enforceable rights. Section III shows the historical evolution of third party
beneficiary rights and the intent-to-benefit test. In Section IV, I justify why the contract
interpretation approach is preferable to the statutory interpretation approach to
determining individually enforceable rights in treaties. Finally, in Section V, I propose a
modified version of the intent-to-benefit test and apply it to the facts of the SanchezLllamas case.

7

See discussion infra Section IV (A).
See discussion infra Section IV (B).
9
See discussion infra Section IV (C).
10
See discussion infra Section V.
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I.

The Rise of Textualism in Statutory Interpretation
The Supreme Court has increasingly used the textualist approach to determining

whether a statute creates a private cause of action. The Court, however, has not always
been swayed by textualism in this context. Indeed, as with statutory interpretation
generally, the Court has applied three different theories of interpretation to determining
whether a statute creates a private right of action—textualism, intentionalism, and
purposevism.11

Intentionalism emphasizes the intent of the legislature enacting the

statute and thus, suggests that courts should examine both a statue’s text and legislative
history in determining its meaning.12 Purposivists de-emphasize the legislature’s intent
and instead, seek to understand the statute’s broad purposes to determine whether
implication of a private right of action would further the statute’s purpose.13 Textualists
generally attempt to ascertain the meaning of a statute by looking only at its text and deemphasize the intent of those who enacted the statute.14
Although prior to 1964, the Supreme Court rarely implied private rights of action,
in 1964, the Court recognized such a private right of action under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.15 In Borak, applying a methodology
based on purposevism, the Court noted that a private cause of action should be implied in

11

Branford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 Ariz. St.
L.J. 815, 818 (2002).
12
Id. at 818. See also Ediberto Roman, “Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure of
Textualism,” 75 Neb. L. Rev. 377, 388 (1996). There are two types of intentionalism—archeological and
hypothetical intentionalism. Archeological intentionalism seeks to identify the intent of the legislature
based on the statute’s text and legislative history, while hypothetical intentionalism seeks to determine how
a legislature would wanted a particular issue resolved. Id.
13
Mank, supra note 11, at 818-19. See also, Roman, supra note 12, at 389-90.
14
Mank, supra note 11, at 819. See also, Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 39-40 (1997)
(“My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what
constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an
authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”).
15
Mank, supra note 11, at 845. See also Cannon v. Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735 (1979) (J. Powell
dissenting).
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a statute whenever such a remedy would advance the statute’s purpose.16 Following the
approach in Borak, between 1964 and 1975, the Court expanded private rights of actions
to several other contexts—the Social Security Act of 1935, 17 the Voting Rights Act of
1965,18 and the Harbors Act of 1989.19
However, in Cort v. Ash,20 in attempting to narrow Borak’s approach, the Court
proposed a four-factor test for deciding whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted, (2) whether there is implicit or explicit evidence that Congress intended to grant
the proposed right of action, (3) whether a private right of action would advance the
“underlying purposes of the legislative schedule,” and (4) whether the cause of action is
traditionally identified with state law and whether a federal cause of action would impede
on important state concerns.21 A combination of two theoretical approaches underlie the
Cort test—intentionalism and purposevism. Thus, courts must determine both the intent
of the legislature as well as the purpose of the statute in question.22
Even though the four factors in Cort may have been intended to constrain courts
from implying private rights of action, twenty federal appellate decisions implied private
rights of action within four years of Cort.23 After the late 1970s, however, the Court
began to apply the Cort standard more narrowly by focusing on the prong requiring
Congressional intent to create a right of action.24 Emblematic of this shift was Touche

16

Mank, supra note 11, at 845.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
18
Allen v. State Bd., 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
19
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 398 U.S. 191 (1967).
20
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
21
Id. at 78.
22
Roman, supra note 12, at 401.
23
Mank, supra note 11, at 846.
24
Id. at 846. See also Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of
17
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Rosse & Co. v. Redignton, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), in which the Court focused on the intent
of Congress as expressed through the text of the statute.25 The Court concluded that the
statute in question did not create a private right of action, because it did not manifest
Congressional intent to create such a remedy.26
Decided the same year as Touche Rosse, the majority opinion in Cannon v.
Chicago27 appears to be an aberration in the Court’s embrace of textualism. Indeed, the
majority opinion in Cannon applied the Cort test in a manner closely resembling the
intent-to-benefit test under contract law.28 In Cannon, the Court permitted a woman to
sue two private universities for denying her admission on the basis of her sex, because it
found that Title IX of the Education Amendments created an implied right of action.29
The Court reasoned that, although the statute does not expressly authorize a private right
of action, the statute satisfies the “threshold question” under Cort -- whether it was
“enacted to benefit a special class of which plaintiff is a member.”30 The relevant statute
stated that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”31

In holding that

the statute satisfied the first factor of the Cort test, Justice Stevens noted that Congress

Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 861, 868-69 (1996); Richard B. Stewart and
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, Harvard L. Rev. 1196, 1196-97 (1982) (“The past
few years, however, have seen a sharp reversal. The Supreme Court has all but repudiated Borak and has
created a strong presumption against judicial recognition of private rights of action. The Court's restrictive
approach has provoked sharp controversy. Some commentators argue that it has deprived regulatory
beneficiaries of an appropriate and effective remedy for administrative failure.”)
25
Touche Rosse & Co. v. Redignton, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). See also Roman, supra note 12, at 402-07
(noting the shift in the Court’s approach towards textualism post-Cort v. Ash).
26
Touche Rosse & Co. v. Redignton, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
27
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
28
See discussion infra Section III.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 689.
31
Id. at 681.
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drafted the statute “with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.”32 He further
found that “the right or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most
accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.”33 The opinion
consulted liberally with the legislative history and concluded that every other factor of
Cort was also satisfied.34
Despite the short-lived victory of intentionalism in Cannon, the Court’s opinion in
Alexander v. Sandoval35 rang the death knell for all other theories in favor of textualism.
In Sandoval, a private individual sued to enforce a regulation promulgated by the
Department of Justice pursuant to Title IV.36 The Court found that, although the
regulation in question contained “rights-creating language,” it could only create a right of
action if the statute pursuant to which the section was enacted created a right of action.37
By examining only the text of the statute, the Court concluded that the relevant statutory
section did not create a right of action because it contained no “rights-creating
language.”38 Justice Scalia wrote that “[w]e . . . begin (and find that we can end) our
search for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI.”39
The Court extended the rigorous requirement for implying private causes of
action to Section 1983 actions in Gonzaga University v. Doe.40 In that case, the Court
rejected prior precedent in the Section 1983 context that suggested that a private right of

32

Id. at 691.
Id. at 693 fn. 13.
34
Id. at 694-709.
35
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 287.
39
Id. at 288.
40
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
33
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action is created if the statute “benefits” the plaintiff.41 Instead the Court found that the
correct question to ascertain whether to imply a private right of action is “whether
Congress intended to create a federal right.”42 In determining Congressional intent, the
Court analyzed only the “text and structure” of the statute and concluded that Congress
did not intend to create new individual rights.43
Consequently, although historically three different theories have been utilized by
the Court in determining whether a statute gives rise to individually enforceable rights,
the modern approach clearly marks a victory for textualism. And even when courts have
used the language of intentionalism, they often refuse to look outside the text of the
statute in determining Congressional intent. The practical effect of a textualist approach
is that courts are less likely to imply a cause of action in a statute, because it prohibits
courts from searching extra-textual sources that might otherwise show that Congress
intended to benefit third parties.44
II.

The Rise of Textualism in Treaty Interpretation
The principles of treaty interpretation employed by the Supreme Court loosely

parallel the three theories that underlie statutory interpretation described in Section I
above—intentionalism, purposevism and textualism. As in the statutory interpretation
context, the theory that underlines a court’s methodology informs whether or not it will
use extra-textual sources in determining the meaning of a treaty. The Court’s opinion last
term in Sanchez-Llamas implicitly extends textualism to determining individually

41

Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
43
Id. at 286.
44
Benjamin Labow, Note, “Federal Courts: Alexander v. Sandoval: Civil Rights Without Remedies,” 56
Okla. L. Rev. 205, 224 (2003).
42
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enforceable rights under treaties.45 The consequence of using the textualist approach to
treaty interpretation is that it is less likely that courts will allow individuals to bring
claims based on treaties, because the text of treaties rarely explicitly provide for
individually enforceable rights.
Courts that take an intentionalist approach46 often employ a cannon of treaty
interpretation that calls for treaties to be interpreted “liberally” and in “good faith.”47
This approach is often used by courts to justify employing a theory of intentionalism.
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,48 exemplifies this approach. In that case,
the Court wrote that “treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.”49

Under

the intentionalist approach, courts often consult extra-textual sources without regard to
whether or not the text of the treaty is ambiguous and may even consult extra-textual
sources when they find the text of the treaty to be clear.50

45

See discussion infra Section V.
See e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127, 49 S.Ct. 47, 73 L.Ed. 214; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258, 271, 10 S.Ct. 295, 33 L.Ed. 642; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 475, 11 S.Ct. 897, 35 L.Ed. 581; Tucker v.
Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437, 22 S.Ct. 195, 46 L.Ed. 264; Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct.
515, 68 L.Ed. 1041. Factor v. Laubenheimer. See also Michael S. Straubel, Textualism, Contextualism,
and Scientific Method in Treaty Interpretation: How Do We Find the Shared Intent of the Parties? 40
Wayne L. Rev. 1191, 1192-93 (1994).
47
In elaborating on “liberal interpretation,” in the 1890 Supreme Court opinion in Geofroy v. Riggs, Justice
Field stated that: “[i]t is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be
liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity
between them.” 133 U. S. 258, 267, 272 (1890). The notion of good faith is often linked with liberal
interpretation and was described by Justice Brown in Tucker v. Alexandroff, where he said that a treaty,
“should be interpreted . . . in a manner to carry out its manifest purpose.... [They] should be interpreted in
that broad and liberal spirit which is calculated to make for the existence of a perpetual amity [between
nations], so far as it can be done without the sacrifice of individual rights or those principles of personal
liberty which lie at the foundation of our jurisprudence.” 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902).
48
318 U.S. 423 (1943).
49
318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
50
Straubel, supra note 46, at 1201.
46
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Courts also use the purposevism theory advocated by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (“Treaty Convention”). The Treaty Convention calls for treaty
interpreters to determine the “object and purpose” of the treaty.51 Although the United
States is not a party to the Treaty Convention, courts have applied its methodology as
customary international law.52 The Treaty Convention allows for consultation with
extra-textual materials in limited circumstances.53
Justice Scalia is known as a proponent of the third approach to treaty
interpretation – textualism.54

In Chan v. Korean Airways LTD,55 Justice Scalia stated

that “[w]e must thus be governed by the text--solemnly adopted by the governments of
many separate nations--whatever conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting
history that petitioners and the United States have brought to our attention. The latter
may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous . . . But where the text is
clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert an amendment.”56 Justice Brennan wrote
a concurrence in Chan mainly to take issue with the textualist approach to treaty
interpretation advocated by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion. The concurrence

51

Treaty Convention, supra note 2, at art. 31, § 1.
See e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-08 (2000) (“In some cases, the
customary international law of a certain area is itself codified in a treaty. Such is the case with the
customary international law of treaties, which to a large extent has been codified in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.”); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969
F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (1992) (“Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is a
signatory. We have previously applied the Vienna Convention in interpreting treaties . . . as has the
United States Department of State.”); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 fn 15 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“While the United States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States
to apply articles 31 and 32 as customary international law.”).
53
Treaty Convention, supra note 2, at art. 31, § 1. See also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549
(1993) (“Reliance on a treaty's negotiating history (travaux preparatoires ) is a disfavored alternative of last
resort, appropriate only where the terms of the document are obscure or lead to “manifestly absurd or
unreasonable” results (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S., at 340, 8
I.L.M., at 692).
54
Straubel, supra note 46, at 111-17.
55
490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
56
Id. at 134.
52
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pointed out that: “. . . . it is wrong to disregard the wealth of evidence to be found in the
Convention’s drafting history on the intent of the governments that drafted the document.
It is altogether proper that we consider such extrinsic evidence of the treatymakers’
intent.”57 Several commentators have observed that courts are increasingly applying
textualist theories to treaty interpretation.58
The textualist approach and the language of statutory interpretation59 have also
manifested themselves in determining individually enforceable rights under treaties. For
example, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 60 the issue was whether the law of nations creates
a private cause of action that can be enforced through a federal statute (the Alien Tort
Act). Although the case did not involve the interpretation of an international treaty in
making that determination, the Court’s reasoning demonstrates the influence of the

57

Id. at 136.
See e.g., Michael Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687, 691 (1998)
[hereinafter “Dynamic Treaty Interpretation”] (“the Court’s treaty jurisprudence has fallen under the strong
influence of a resurgent strain of formalism in domestic statutory interpretation”); David Bederman,
Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 U.C.L.A Rev. 953, 1022 (1994) [hereinafter “Revivalist
Canons”] (“So while the prevailing rhetoric of [treaty interpretation] is contractual, the underlying idiom
and approach is statutory.”). See also id. at 1019-20 (1994) (“recent trends in treaty construction have been
subliminally influenced by current trends in statutory interpretation debate”).
59
See e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (“As for Paraguay's suits (both the original action and
the case coming to us on petition for certiorari), neither the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention
clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United States' courts to set aside a criminal
conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions.”)(emphasis added); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) (“These conventions, however, only
set forth substantive rules of conduct and state that compensation shall be paid for certain wrongs. They do
not create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in
United States courts.”) (emphasis added); DiLaura v. Power Authority of State of New York, 786 F.Supp.
241, 252 (W.D.N.Y.1991) (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835, 97 S.Ct. 102, 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976)) (“A treaty must provide expressly for a private right of action
before a plaintiff can assert a claim thereunder in federal court.”)(emphasis added); Smith v. Canadian
Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir.1971)). See also In re Letters Rogatory from Caracas,
1998 WL 107029, *1 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (holding that those plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce a provision
of a treaty which did not confer any identifiable right upon them). Haudenosaunee Six Nations of Iroquois
(Confederacy) of North America Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1998 WL 748351, W.D.N.Y.,1998 (It is
readily apparent--and Judge Arcara of this Court has previously held--that the Treaty does not create a
private cause of action)(emphasis added); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 835, 97 S.Ct. 102, 50 L.Ed.2d 1 01 (1976) (A treaty must provide expressly for a private right of
action before a plaintiff can assert a claim thereunder in federal court).
60
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
58
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textualist methodology in determining private rights of actions under international law.
Justice Souter delivering the opinion for the Court states that:
. . . this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private
right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of
cases. . . . . even when Congress has made it clear by statute that a rule applies to
purely domestic conduct, we are reluctant to infer intent to provide a private cause
of action where the statute does not supply one expressly. While the absence of
congressional action addressing private rights of action under an international
norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it creates a
statute, the possible collateral consequences of making international rules
privately actionable argue for judicial caution.61
Moreover, the Court’s decision last term in Sanchez-Llamas marked the direction
of the Roberts Court in favor of textualism in determining private rights of action in
treaties. The Court assumed (without attaching any precedential value to it) that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“Consular Convention”)62 creates
individually enforceable rights, but it nullified any such right by holding that the
Consular Convention creates no remedies. Even though the majority opinion written by
Justice Roberts’ paid lip service to the cannon of liberal interpretation,63 the approach he
took was in line with textualism. The opinion failed to consult with extra-textual sources
and found that the Consular Convention does not give an individual a remedy, because
the text does not explicitly provide for it.64
III.

The Intent-to-Benefit Test: The Contract Law Approach to Determining Third
Party Enforcement Rights.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Second Restatement”)65 codifies the

modern approach to determining whether a person who is not a party to a contract is

61

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter “Consular Convention”].
63
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2679.
64
Id. at 2677-83.
65
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) [hereinafter “Second Restatement”].
62
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nevertheless entitled to enforce the contract. The intent-to-benefit test derived from
Section 302(1)(b) of the Restatement Second suggests that a third party should be entitled
to enforce a contract if the parties intended to benefit such party and the circumstances
(including extra-textual materials) indicate that the promisor intended to give the benefit
of the promised performance to the third party. The Second Restatement’s intentionalist
approach is a departure from the First Restatement of Contracts (“First Restatement”)66
more textualist approach to contract interpretation.
Modern third party beneficiary concepts trace their roots to English common law.
Dutton v. Poole, decided in 1677, is often cited to illustrate the roots of third party
beneficiary law.67 In that case, a father was going to sell wood to raise money for a
dowry for his daughter.68 His son, who would have otherwise inherited the wood,
promised the father that he would pay £1000 to the daughter if the father did not sell the
wood.69 The father died and the son refused to pay the money to the daughter. Although
the daughter was not a party to the contract, the court held that the daughter could enforce
the contract against the son.70
As classical contract theory gained popularity in England, courts became reluctant
to grant rights to individuals who were not party to a contract since doing so often
required deviating from the express text of the contract. Indeed, the principle favoring
third party beneficiary rights was repudiated in 1861 in Tweddle v. Atkinson.71 In that

66

Restatement of Contracts (1932) [hereinafter “First Restatement”].
83 Eng.Rep. 523 (K.B.1677).
68
Id. at 523.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 524.
71
1 B. & S. 393 (Q.B. 1861).
67
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case the court found that a son-in-law could not enforce a contract against his father-inlaw, who had promised to pay the son-in-law’s father a certain sum of money.72
The same tension between acknowledging the rights of third party beneficiaries
and classical contract theory played itself out in U.S. courts.73 Although third party
beneficiaries were permitted to enforce contracts long before Lawrence v. Fox,74 decided
in 1859 by the New York Court of Appeals, it is often cited as the turning point for
recognition of third party beneficiary rights.75 In that case, under a contract between
Holly and Fox, Holly loaned $300 to Fox, and Fox in turn agreed to pay $300 to
Lawrence in satisfaction of a preexisting debt that Holly owed to Lawrence.76 The court
held that Lawrence could enforce the contract against Fox even though he was not
specifically named in the contract.77 In subsequent years, New York courts pared back
the holding in Lawrence v. Fox to its bare minimum.78 Other state courts, notably
Massachusetts, refused to recognize third party beneficiary rights all together.79
The rise of modern contract law in the 1920s led to the recognition of the
enforcement of rights of third party beneficiaries, a shift that was ultimately codified in
the First Restatement. Section 133 of the First Restatement provided:

72

Id. at 398.
See e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1358 (1992). Martin
Eisenberg points out that recognizing third party beneficiary rights conflicts with the following three major
premises of classical contract law: first, contract law can and should be developed in an axiomatic fashion;
second, persons would not readily engage in contracting if they faced the threat of high liability; and third,
standardized rules are preferable to individualized rules. Id. at 1365-68. Third party beneficiary law
conflicts with all three principles because: first, it is at odds with basic principles of contract law that
require that there must be privity and consideration in order to enforce a contract; second, allowing thirdparty beneficiaries to bring suit expands a promisors’ liability; and third, in adjudicating suits by third-party
beneficiaries, courts would need to conduct individualized inquiries into the facts and intent. Id. at 1365.
74
20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
75
Id. at 1363-1364.
76
Id. at 269.
77
Id. at 269.
78
Id. at 1367.
79
Id. at 1368.
73
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(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than
the promisee, that person is ...:
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the
accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the
promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the
beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to
the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of
the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the
promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the
beneficiary ...;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those
stated in Clause (b) exist.
Even though the First Restatement acknowledged enforcement rights for third
parties, it narrowly circumscribed those rights. Under the First Restatement, only two
categories of individuals were given enforceable rights—creditor beneficiaries and donee
beneficiaries. 80 A donee beneficiary was a beneficiary to whom the promisee intended to
benefit as a gift, while a creditor beneficiary was a beneficiary to whom the promisee
owed a debt and wished to satisfy that debt by requiring the promisor to make a payment
to the beneficiary.81
The Second Restatement broadened the scope of third parties that have
enforceable rights.82 Although contract disputes are governed by state law, many states
have adopted the third party beneficiary test set forth in the Second Restatement.83
Section 302(1) of the Second Restatement states that:

80

First Restatement, supra note 66, at §§ 135-36 (providing for enforcement rights for creditor and donee
beneficiaries).
81
Id. at § 133(1)(a).
82
Second Restatement, supra note 65, at § 302.
83
See e.g., Septembertide Publishing v. Stein & Day, 884 F.2d 675 (2d. Cir. 1989) (the court identifies
Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the appropriate test to determine third party
beneficiary rights under New York law); Flexfab, LLC v. U.S., 62 Fed. Cl. 139 (Fed. Cl. 2004)
(subcontractor failed to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of contract between contractor and the
government because modification of contract made it a joint payee). See also David M. Summers, Third
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Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and
either:
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 84
In applying the Second Restatement test, one Federal Court of Appeals Court
classified it into two components: (1) an intent-to-benefit test; and (2) a duty owed test.85

Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 880, 889-90 (1982) (“It
is not surprising that the tentative provisions of the Restatement Second met with approval in both state
and federal courts. The Restatement Second’s approach potentially offers a consistent rationale for third
party beneficiary cases falling outside the first Restatement categories, and for the new and complex factual
situations likely to arise in the future.”); Williston on Contracts, § 37:5. (“In a significant number of states,
certain aspects of the law relating to contracts for the benefit of third persons are governed by statute. Most
of these statutes are of a limited nature, regulating a few, well-defined areas of third party beneficiary
doctrine, and governing specific contractual relationships. Some states, however, have broad statutory
provisions which effectively codify and implement the common-law third party beneficiary doctrine. For
example, the California statute, on which several others are based, provides that ‘[a] contract, made
expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto
rescind it.’”). But see Williston on Contracts, § 37:7. Donee, creditor, intended, and incidental
beneficiaries (“The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also classifies the protected and unprotected
beneficiaries, but eliminates the terminology “creditor” and “donee” beneficiaries, lumping the protected
beneficiaries into one broad class, “intended” beneficiaries, and designating all other, unprotected
beneficiaries as “incidental.” This change in terminology has not been well received by the courts, in part
because of their familiarity with the traditional phraseology and in part because of its helpful, descriptive
qualities.”).
84
Comment (d) of section 302 of the Second Restatement adds another basis for a beneficiary to be
considered an “intended beneficiary”—those who reliance on the promisee is both reasonable and probable.
Id. at cmt. d (“Either a promise to pay the promisee’s debt to a beneficiary or a gift promise involves a
manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make
reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable. Other cases may be quite similar in this respect.
Examples are a promise to perform a supposed or asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a
lien on the promisee’s property, or a promise to satisfy the duty of a third person. In such cases, if the
beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on
him, he is an intended beneficiary. Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable,
considerations of procedural convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the manifested
intention of the parties may affect the question whether under Subsection (1) recognition of a right in the
beneficiary is appropriate. In some cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute,
requires recognition of such a right without regard to the intention of the parties.”)
85
Dayton Development Co. v. Gilman Financial Services, Inc., 419 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005). See also
McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that as is generally the case in matters of contract
interpretation, the crux of third party beneficiary analysis is intent of parties); Camco Oil Corp. v. Vander
Laan, 220 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1955) (“in order for a third party to recover on a contract to which he is not a
party, it must clearly be shown that the contract was intended for his benefit.”); E.B. Harper & Co., Inc. v.
Nortek, Inc., 104 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1997) (in order for third party to have right to sue, the contract must be
undertaken for plaintiff’s direct benefit and contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear; if

16

The intent-to-benefit test flows from Section 302(1)(b), while the “duty owed” test is set
out in Section 302(1)(a) of the Second Restatement. The duty owed test requires that
“the promisor’s performance under the contract must discharge a duty otherwise owed
the third party by the promisee.”86 To satisfy the intent to-benefit test, “the contract must
express some intent by the parties to benefit the third party through contractual
performance.”87 In breaking with the First Restatement, the intent-to-benefit test
suggests that a third party does not have to be either a creditor or a donee to enforce a
contract. Under the intent-to-benefit test whether a non-party has the right to enforce a
contract turns on intent rather than on the relationship between the promisor and the party
attempting to enforce the contract.88
The shift in approach to third party beneficiaries from the First Restatement to the
Second Restatement is consistent with the diverging contract law theories espoused by
the drafters of the Restatements. Samuel Williston, the main drafter of the First
intent is not express on face of contract, its implication at least must be so strong as to be practically an
express declaration); Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 114 Ed. Law Rep. 771 (9th Cir.
1996), as amended, (Dec. 19, 1996) (“to create a third party beneficiary contract, the parties must intend
that the promisor assume a direct obligation to the intended beneficiary at the time they enter into the
contract, and to determine the contracting parties’ intent, the court should construe the contract as a whole,
in light of the circumstances under which it was made”).
86
Dayton, 419 F.3d at 857.
87
Id. at 856. Some courts adopt a test that requires the contract to manifest not only an intent-to-benefit the
third party, but also an “intent to create a right of action.” See e.g., Dureiko v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl.
340, 364 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (finding that the owner of a mobile home park was not an intended beneficiary of
a contract between the government and a company that removes debris, because the contract did not
“reflect an intent to create enforceable rights in plaintiffs”). However, such a test is inconsistent with the
modern principles enshrined in the Second Restatement and is another manifestation of an attempt by
courts to import the statutory interpretation model into determining whether a contract creates individual
enforcement rights.
David Summers also points out that some courts incorrectly found that because the primary
purpose of a contract was not to benefit the third party beneficiary, the contract did not give rise to
individual enforcement rights. Summers, supra note 83, at 892-93 (citing Sachs v. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
148 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1945) (beneficiary of a reinsurance may not recover because agreement was
not made “for his direct benefit, or . . . primarily for his benefit.”); Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glen Falls Indem.
Co., 126 N.E.2d 750 (1955) (materialman may sue as third party beneficiary on a payment bond because
bond’s primary purpose was payment of materialmen); Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical
Contractors, 406 P.2d 556, 569 (1965) (subcontractors not third party beneficiaries of fire-insurance policy
without proof that contracting parties “had in mind a benefit to anyone other than themselves”)).
88
Williston on Contracts, § 37:8.
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Restatement, was influenced by classical contract theory, which rejects searching for the
intent of the parties from outside of the “four corners” of the contract.89 Williston
believed that contracts should be interpreted in much the same manner as the textualists
interpret statutes today.90 Williston argued that evidence of contemporaneous
agreements and negotiations about the contract and the meaning of its terms should not
be used to explain the parties’ intentions or to vary or contradict the plain meaning of the
agreement.91 Clearly, such a theory would frown upon granting rights to individuals who
are not a parties to a contract unless such rights are explicitly written in the contract.
The Second Restatement, on the other hand, parted ways from utilizing the
textualist theory suggested by classical contract theory in favor of an intentionalist
approach.92 The underpinning of the intentionalist theory is that contract interpretation is
a search for the shared intent of the parties and the written language of the contract is
only probative, but not conclusive of such intent. 93 In line with this theory, Corbin, the

89

See e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L.J. 997, 1012-13
(1985).
90
Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195, 199-200 (1998).
91
Id.
92
One commentator has pointed out the difficulty in determining the intent of the parties. Orna S. Paglin,
Criteria for Recognition of Third Party Beneficiary Rights, New England Law Review 66-67 (1989). See
also American Jurisprudence, Proof of Facts 2d, § 5 (“Unfortunately, determining the intention of the
contracting parties with respect to a third person is not the easiest of legal tasks.”).
93
See e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statues Really “Legislative Bargains”? The Failure of the Contract
Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N. C. L. Rev. 1145, 1162 (1998) (“Yet, in significant respects,
contemporary contract interpretation has come to reject the classical model. Under contemporary
principles, contract interpretation is not principally a search for the objective meaning of a text, but rather a
search for the shared intent of the parties. To be sure, the words of the parties’ written agreement will be
probative of their intent; in most cases, in fact, the words will provide conclusive evidence. But the goal, as
Arthur Corbin once explained, “is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties (their meaning), and not
the meaning that the written words convey . . . to any third persons, few or many, reasonably intelligent or
otherwise.” Under contemporary principles, where extrinsic evidence shows that the parties shared an
intent at odds with the objective meaning of the written agreement, their intent, not the writing, prevails.”).
See also id. at 1149 (“Contract interpretation is properly intentionalist: in interpreting a contract, a court
properly looks to the shared intent of the parties rather than the objective meaning of the written agreement.
A contract, after all, is a private agreement that binds only the parties who make it. It exists independently
of any writing the parties have adopted to memorialize it: the writing is not the contract, but merely
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principal influence behind the Second Restatement, advocated the liberalization of the
parol evidence rule to make extrinsic evidence more readily admissible by allowing a
written contract to be supplemented by extrinsic evidence unless the written contract was
a complete integration.94 Consequently, the intentionalist approach that prevailed in the
drafting of the Second Restatement would favor determining the intent of the parties from
both the text and extrinsic sources. Moreover, this approach is more comfortable with
allowing third parties who were not specifically identified in a contract to enforce the
contract.
IV.

Justifications for Applying Intentionalism from Contract Interpretation
instead of Textualism from Statutory Interpretation to Determining
Individually Enforceable Rights Under Treaties
The theory of intentionalism that underlies third party beneficiary rights under

contract law should be used in determining whether or not a treaty gives rise to
individually enforceable rights. Three general grounds support this view. First,
interpretive theories reflect the characteristics of the document they seek to interpret and
treaties should be interpreted like contracts because they bear greater similarities to
contracts than to statutes. Second, the Constitution and the Supreme Court
interpretations thereof support the notion that treaties are contracts, even though they
have the effect of statutes. Third, the rationales offered to support a textualist approach
to implying private rights of actions in statutes do not apply to treaty interpretation.
A.

Treaties as Contracts

evidence of the contract. In traditional form, moreover, a contract comprises just two parties and a limited
subject matter. Given all this, intentionalism is a sensible interpretive strategy. Concerns about notice to
third persons do not exist; the writing bears little formal significance; and there is small chance that
examining a contract’s negotiating history will present great practical burdens.”).
94
Id. at 205-06.
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1. Structural Similarities Between Treaties and Contracts
David Bederman points out that “[m]ost of the confusion over essential principles
in treaty interpretation has to do with whether international agreements are more like
contracts than legislation or whether they are something altogether sui generis.”95
Cannons of interpretation take into account the characteristics of the document they are
meant to interpret. I argue that treaties are characteristically similar contracts and as
such, courts should apply the prevailing interpretive rules developed for contracts96 to
treaty interpretation.
As the chart below illustrates, treaties are virtually identical to contracts in how
they are drafted, negotiated, approved and amended. Both treaties and contracts have
signatories whereas statutes do not. The parties bound by treaties and contracts are the
ones who are signatories to them, while the parties who are governed by a certain statute
are those within the jurisdiction of the statute. The Treaty Convention confirms the view
that a treaty is fundamentally similar to a contract—it defines a treaty as “an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.”97 Statutes, on the other hand, are negotiated,
approved and may be repealed or superseded by a majority of the relevant legislative
body. Given the close similarities between treaties and contracts and differences between
treaties and statutes, it is more appropriate to interpret treaties using the interpretive rules
that are accepted for contracts rather than for statutes.
Chart Comparing the Characteristics of Contracts, Treaties, and Statutes
95

Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note58, at 963.
My use of the word “contract” herein, refers to written contracts.
97
Treaty Convention, supra note 2, at Article 1(a).
96
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Contracts

Treaties

Statutes

Signatories

The parties to a
contract are
signatories to it

Same as contracts

There are no
signatories to a
statute

Structure

The provisions
reflect agreements
among the parties
to do or abstain
from doing certain
things
The parties to a
contract negotiate
and draft it

Same as contracts

The provisions are
intended to govern
people within the
applicable
jurisdiction

Same as contracts

The applicable
legislators negotiate
and their staff drafts it

Approval

Approved by all
parties thereto

Same as contracts98

Approved by a
majority of the
applicable legislature

Amendment

May be amended
by consent of all
the parties

Same as contracts99

May be amended by a
majority of the
applicable legislature

Parties Bound

Typically only
signatories are
bound by it

Same as
contracts100

People or entities
within the relevant
jurisdiction are bound
by it101

Drafting &
Negotiation
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Although Article 9(2) of the Treaty Convention provides that “[t]he adoption of the text of a treaty at an
international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the
same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule,” a State is not bound by a treaty unless it
expresses its intent to be bound. Treaty Convention, supra note 2, at Article 9(2) and Article 11 (“The
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”).
99
See The Federalist No. 64, at 14-15 (John Jay) (E.G. Bourne ed., 1937) (“but let us not forget that treaties
are made, not only by one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the context of
both was essential to their formation at first, so it must ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them”).
100
See Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 131 (Cambridge University Press 2003)
(“When a treaty has entered into force, it is in force only for those states who have consented to be bound
by it. A treaty therefore is not like national legislation, which, once in force, is in force for all to whom it is
directed. A treaty is much closer in character to a contract”). See also The Federalist No. 75 at 450
(Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961) (“Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations which have the force of
law . . . . They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign
and sovereign).
101
See e.g., Movsesian, supra note 93, at 1175 (“A statute is not a private agreement that binds only the
legislators who enact it, but a public document that establishes rules of conduct for people outside the
legislature-- rules those people must follow, in many instances, on pain of fine or imprisonment.”).
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2.

Response to Critics

Some scholars have argued that treaties should be viewed as statutes while others
have advocated viewing treaties as neither statutes nor contracts.102 Michael P. Van
Alstine believes that certain types of treaties, which he calls “legislative treaties,” are
more like legislation. One example he gives of such a treaty is the United Nations
Convention on the International Sales of Goods (“UN Convention”). He argues that
treaties such as the UN Convention have “have the look and feel of standard federal
statutes” because, among other things, “their operative provisions impose no formal
obligations on the United States in its internal conduct as a sovereign entity” and their
“provisions merely regulate the relations between private entities involved in defined
commercial transactions.”103 However, contracts impose no liability on governmental
entities (unless they are party to them) and typically only regulate the conduct of private
entities. Thus, what he labels “legislative treaties” appear to be more like contracts than
statutes.104
Alex Glashausser argues that treaties are neither contracts nor statutes, but sui
generis.105 First, Glashausser notes that a treaty, unlike a statute, has diplomatic
purposes: “it is a symbol of the bond between nations.”106 While it is true that some
treaties may only have diplomatic purposes, many treaties manifest binding agreements-102

One commentator points out that the “matter of treaty interpretation has thus far received only limited
scholarly attention.” Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 Cal. L. Rev.
1263, 1266 (2002) [hereinafter “Treaty Delegation”].
103
Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, supra note 58, at 706.
104
Some scholars have even argued that statutes should be interpreted like contracts. See e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 667, 667 (1991) (arguing that statutes
should be interpreted like contracts); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705 (1992) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted like contracts).
But see Movsesian, supra note 93 (arguing against the contact analogy for statutes).
105
Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. Cinn. L.
Rev. 1243 (2005).
106
Id. at 1271.
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such as delineating boundaries, agreements on trade tariffs or the treaties relating to the
rights of individuals. Second, Glashausser argues that treaties differ from contracts
because the bargaining power of parties to a treaty may be unequal,107 people who
negotiate treaties come from different cultures,108 words are difficult to translate across
languages.109 While all of these characteristics distinguish treaties from very standard
contracts, many sophisticated cross-border commercial contracts share the same
characteristics as treaties— the bargaining power among the parties may be unequal and
they may be negotiated by parties who speak different languages and come from different
cultures.
Third, Glashausser argues that treaties are different from contracts because States
may not intend to be bound by them even though they may outwardly support the
treaty.110 Even if this is true, not only is not possible for courts to divine the hidden intent
of the parties at the time the parties entered into the treaty, it would contravene the law of
nations and the rule of law to support such a principle. Finally, Glashausser argues that
treaties impact people beyond just the parties to the treaty and treaties may not have the
same enforcement mechanisms as contracts.111 I fully agree that people who are intended
to be benefited by treaties do not have the same enforcement rights as individuals who
are intended beneficiaries of contracts and propose in this paper that they should have
greater rights.
In creating his own proposed interpretative norms for treaty interpretation that
blend statutory norms and contractual norms, James Wolf appears to view treaties as sui
107

Id. at 1272-1273.
Id. at 1280-1282.
109
Id. at 1277-1278.
110
Id. at 1288.
111
Id. at 1282-1288.
108
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generis.112 He argues that treaties are like statutes because they are rules of decision113
and are like contracts because they confer rights and impose duties on the nations parties
to them.114 Wolf argues that treaties diverge from contracts mainly because no
consideration is necessary for a treaty to be valid.115 Wolf, however, is incorrect in
concluding that treaties have no consideration. Indeed, treaties do have consideration in
the broad sense of the term.
Consideration in the broad sense “cover[s] all the reasons deemed sufficient to
render a promise enforceable, while the narrow concept of the term, singles out one
reason deemed sufficient for enforcement of promises: the bargained-for exchange.”116
Although there may be no formal requirement in international law that a treaty manifest a
bargain-for exchange, there are other formal requirements necessary to make a treaty
valid and enforceable. Indeed, the Treaty Convention states that the parties to a treaty
must have the capacity and full powers to enter into a treaty,117 must consent to be bound
by the treaty,118 and that treaties may be invalidated for reasons such as fraud,119 error,120
or duress.121 Thus, the requirements for the validity and enforceability of a treaty are
consistent with the broad definition of consideration.

112

James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1023,
1069-1070 (1988).
113
Id. at 1051.
114
Id. at 1052-53.
115
Id.
116
See Corbin on Contracts § 5.1. Consideration in the narrow sense is designed primarily to prevent
donative promises from being enforced. See Corbin on Contracts, § 5.2.
117
Treaty Convention, supra note 2, arts. 6 and 7.
118
Id. at arts. 12-15.
119
Id. at art. 49.
120
Id. at art. 48.
121
Id. at arts. 50-52.
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B.

Treaties are Like Contracts That Have the Effect of Statutes

Many courts probably consider treaties to be statutes and apply theories of
statutory interpretation to them because the Constitution calls treaties the “law of the
land.”122 However, even though the Constitution indicates that treaties should have the
effect of statutes, Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the position that treaties are
more like contracts. For example, in Diamond Rings,123 the Court clearly identified a
treaty as a contract by calling it “an agreement, league or contract between two or more
nations or sovereigns, formally signed by commissioners properly authorized, and
solemnly ratified by the sovereigns or the supreme power of each state.”124 The Court
further stated that a treaty “[i]n its essence . . . is a contract. It differs from an ordinary
contract only in being an agreement between independent states instead of private
parties.”125 More recently, the Court in Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass’n, noted that “[a] treaty is essentially a contract between or among sovereign
nations.”126
While some courts have clearly stated that a treaty is a contract, other courts have
created rules to give treaties the effect of statutes. First, courts have invalidated state
laws that are deemed to be inconsistent with treaties, giving treaties the effect of federal
122

U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”)
123
183 US 176 (1901).
124
Id. at 182.
125
Id.
126
443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979). See also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (“As treaties are
contracts between independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning ‘as understood
in the public law of nations.’”) (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 271 (1890)); Harris v. United
States, 768 F.2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 1985) vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 957 (1986) (“International
agreements should be construed more like contracts than statutes.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US 515, 581
(1832) (stating that a treaty “is a compact between two nations or communities having the right of selfgovernment”).
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statutes.127 Second, courts have found that, as the case with statutes, a treaty can be
trumped by a later in time statute.128 Finally, the Supreme Court created the Charming
Betsy principle, a cannon of interpretation that calls for U.S. statutes to be interpreted in
harmony with treaties to which the U.S is a party, which elevates a treaty to the status of
a statute.129
Even though treaties have the effect of statutes, the Constitution distinguishes
them from federal legislation in several important ways. First, unlike in the statutory
ratification process, the House of Representatives does not play a role in the approval of a
treaty.130 Second, while the Senate can modify a statute that it enacts, the Senate has the
right only to approve or disapprove of a treaty and cannot change it.131 Third, the
President negotiates and enters into treaties while the legislature enacts a statute.132
The Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations thereof reflect the dual
character of treaties in our democratic system. Treaties have the effect of statutes, but
are recognized to be characteristically similar to contracts. The characteristics of a
document and not its effect should guide what interpretive principles are applied to it.
The Constitution and interpretations thereof confirm that a treaty is a contract.
Consequently, it is more appropriate to apply modern contract theories to treaty
interpretation than theories emanating from statutory interpretation.
127

See e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Bacardi
Corporation of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937);
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924). See also Aust, supra note 100, at 159.
128
See e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1947); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v.
Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1933); Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99
(1884).
129
Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 6 U.S. 64 (1804). See also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line
Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (applying the Charming Betsy principle); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004) (same); Young v. U.S., 97 U.S. 39 U.S. (1877) (same).
130
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.2.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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C.

Justifications for Textualism from Statutory Interpretation are Not
Applicable in the Treaty Interpretation Context

Reasons offered to support textualism for purposes of determining whether a
statute gives rise to a private right of action are not applicable in the context of treaty
interpretation. First, those who support textualist readings of statutes argue that courts
usurp legislative powers when they imply private rights of actions in statutes. Justice
Powell’s dissent in Cannon is emblematic of this view.133 He argued that it is Congress
under Article III of the Constitution that has the power to determine the jurisdiction of
courts and that implying a private cause of action “extends the authority of the court to
embrace a dispute that Congress has not assigned it to resolve.”134 Others have pointed
out that courts invade the legislative domain by creating remedies that Congress has not
provided by implying private rights of actions in statutes.135 Yet others argue that
legislatures are better able than courts to assess the costs and benefits of enforcing a
statute and to fine-tune the level of compliance with the statute.136
Second, others argue that not only do courts usurp the constitutional powers of the
legislative branch, they infringe upon the Executive when they imply private rights of
action in statutes. Congress has delegated the enforcement of certain statutes to executive
agencies. When courts imply private rights of action in those statutes, they invade the
discretion of the Executive about what actions should be enforced.137 Third, some
textualists argue that it is futile to use extra-textual sources to determine intent, because it

133

Cannon v. Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (J. Powell dissenting).
Id. at 746.
135
Stabile, supra note 24, at 884.
136
Stabile, supra note 24, at 882.
137
Stabile, supra note 24, at 882-83.
134

27

is impossible to find a single intent within a large collective body such as Congress.138
Others argue that even if legislative history provides insight into intent, it should not be
used because it would not provide the view of Congress collectively, but rather of just
individual representatives.139
None of the arguments offered to support refraining from implying private rights
of actions in legislation apply to treaties. First, in interpreting treaties, courts do not
intervene on Congressional powers.140 Unlike statutes, it is the President, and not
Congress, that has the power to “make treaties” under the Constitution.141 Moreover, the
Executive may even terminate United States’ participation in a treaty without consulting
with the Senate.142 The Senate only has the limited power to accept or reject a treaty.143
This power is vastly different from formulating and adopting statutes.144 Thus, when
courts interpret treaties to imply individually enforceable rights, they are not usurping the
constitutional powers of the Senate.
Second, courts do not infringe on powers that Congress has delegated to the
Executive when they determine that treaties have individually enforceable rights.
Because Congress has the power to make statutes under the Constitution, it has the
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Mank, supra note 11, at 824.
Roman, supra note 12, at 386.
140
Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 58, at 1022 (noting that the statutory interpretation debate is
“preoccupied with the balance of power between judges and legislatures,” while “[t]his concern is simply
irrelevant in the treaty sphere”).
141
John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1305, 1309
(2002) (“Unlike the authority to enact legislation, the treaty power as a whole is located in Article II of the
Constitution, which indicates that it ought to be regarded as an exclusively executive power. Although the
Senate plays a role in providing its advice and consent, there are several reasons that this exception to the
President's general power over treaties should be read narrowly.”).
142
Id.
143
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.2.
144
Yoo, supra note 141, at 1309 (“The Senate's participation, however, does not transform the treaty power
into a quasi-legislative power so much as it represents the dilution of the unitary nature of the executive
branch, just as the inclusion of the presidential veto over legislation does not undermine the fundamentally
legislative nature of the Article I, Section 8 powers.”).
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correlative power to delegate enforcement of statutes to the Executive. However,
Congress does not have the power to make treaties and, therefore it has no power to
delegate enforcement of treaties to Executive agencies. Consequently, when a court
determines that a treaty creates individually enforceable rights it is not usurping any
powers delegated by Congress to the Executive. In addition, when a court determines
that a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable rights, it is not infringing on any
inherent constitutional powers granted to the Executive either. Although the President
has the authority to make treaties, Article II courts have the authority to interpret them by
virtue of the fact that the Constitution declares a treaty “the law of the land.”145
Third, while it may not be possible to determine the intent of a legislature that
adopted a statute, it might be possible to determine the intent of the parties to a treaty.
Statutes only require that a majority vote in favor of approving legislation, while treaties
require unanimous approval by all treaty parties.146 Therefore, it would be more
appropriate to find a shared intent among the parties to a treaty than the members of a
legislature.
V.

Application of the Intent-to- Benefit Test to Determining Individually
Enforceable Rights under Treaties: The Sanchez-Llamas Case
The main issue raised in Sanchez-Lllamas v. Oregon147 was whether individuals

may assert rights under the Consular Convention in criminal proceedings brought against
them in the U.S. courts.148 Instead of providing guidance to lower courts who have come
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U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (stating that “courts
interpret treaties for themselves”).
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Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 58, at 1022.
147
126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006). The Sanchez-Llamas case consolidated two cases.
148
The precise question presented before the Court in Sanchez-Llamas did not require the Court to
determine whether the petitioners had the right to bring a cause of action on the basis of the Consular
Convention, but rather whether the Consular Convention “create[d] rights that defendants may invoke
against the detaining authorities in a criminal trial or in a post conviction proceeding.” Sanchez-Lllamas,
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to diverging conclusions on this question, 149 Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority
opinion, avoided the issue all together by presuming (without deciding) that the Consular
Convention gives rise to individually enforceable rights. The Court then held that the
Consular Convention does not offer individuals any remedies.150 Consequently, even if
the Court had reached the conclusion that the Consular Convention provides individually
enforceable rights such rights would be ineffective because they could not be enforced.
On the other hand, Justice Breyer, the author of the dissent, argued in favor of
reaching the question of individually enforceable rights.151 Referring to the Head Money
Cases, the dissent stated that “a treaty ‘is the law of the land as an act of Congress is,

126 S.Ct. at 2674. The dissent further pointed out that the “[t]he parties also agree that we need not decide
whether the Convention creates a ‘private right of action,’ i.e., a private right that would allow an
individual to bring a lawsuit for enforcement of the Convention for damages based on its violation.” Id. at
2694.
Although the “intent-to-benefit” test was developed to determine whether a third party has the
right to bring a cause of action on the basis of a contract, this test can be successfully applied to
determining both whether a non-party to a treaty can bring a cause of action on the basis of the treaty or
whether a non-party can use a treaty as a defense in criminal proceedings against him or her.
149
Some courts have held that the Consular Convention creates private rights. See, e.g., Jogi, 425 F.3d at
378-84; United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Standt v. City
of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672,
677 (D.V.I. 1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1999); Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (Article 36 “arguably” confers individual rights). On the other hand,
other courts have held that the Consular Convention does not create individually enforceable rights. See
e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava , 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001).
The party briefs in the case also reflects the lack of clear standards. Brief for Petitioner Mario A.
Bustillo at 16-34, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 05-51) [hereinafter “Bustillo
Brief”] (arguing that that the Vienna Convention creates individual rights on the basis of its text, its travaux
préparatoires, United States’ post-ratification conduct, post-ratification conduct of other signatories and
opinions of the ICJ); Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 14-27, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126
S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter “Moises’ Brief”] (arguing that Article 36 creates individual
rights because of the ordinary meaning of the provision, the purpose of the Consular Convention, the
Travaux Préparatoires of the Consular Convention, the contemporaneous view and subsequent practice of
the United States, and the ICJ opinions); Brief of the Respondent at 10-19, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126
S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 05-51) [hereinafter “Virginia Brief”] (arguing that the Consular Convention does
not create individual rights because of the text of the Consular Convention, the interpretation given to it by
the Executive, the ratification history of the Consular Convention, and the fact that other nations have not
interpreted it to provide for individual rights); Brief for Respondent State of Oregon at 10-37, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter “Oregon Brief”] (arguing that the
Consular Convention does not create individual rights because of its plain text, its negotiation history, its
ratification history, the executive’s interpretation, and the interpretation of other parties).
150
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2674-87.
151
Id. at 2695.
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whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of a private citizen or subject
may be determined.152 And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of
justice,’ in such case the court is to ‘resor[t] to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case
before it as it would a statute.’”153 The dissent further outlines the following
methodology for determining whether a treaty provides for individually enforceable
rights: First, is the treaty self-executing? Second, does the treaty “prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen ... may be determined” or “[a]re the obligations set
forth in [treaty] of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice?”154
Despite the apparent clarity of the methodology articulated by the dissent, the
weakness of the test becomes obvious when it is applied. The dissent concludes that the
Consular Convention gives rise to individually enforceable rights on the basis of
numerous factors: first, the “nature” of the Consular Convention,155 second, the “rights”
language in the Convention, 156 third, the position of the government that other provisions
of the Consular Convention give rise to individually-enforceable rights, 157 and fourth
findings by the Court that other treaties have given rise to individually enforceable
rights.158 The dissent’s methodology does not provide a predicable set of rules for courts
in adjudicating the issue, while the intent-to-benefit does. 159
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 2695.
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Id.
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Id. at 2696.
158
Id.
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The majority and the dissent in Sanchez-Llamas also took opposing positions on whether or not there is
a presumption against finding individually enforceable rights in treaties. The majority opinion in SanchezLlamas states that “there is a presumption that a treaty will be enforced through political and diplomatic
channels rather than through courts.” Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. 2677. On the other hand, the dissent
believes that no such presumption exists and cites the Head Money Cases, which provide that a treaty “may
confer certain enforceable ‘rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other,’” for support. Id. at 2697.
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A.

The Modified Intent-to-Benefit Test

1.

Class of Individuals as Intended Beneficiaries

In order for a class of individuals to be deemed beneficiaries of a contract, the
class must be sufficiently described or designated as intended beneficiaries in the
contract.160 Furthermore, a third party who seeks rights under such a contract must show
that he or she is within the class of intended beneficiaries. For example, the Ninth Circuit
found the parties to a consent decree intended to benefit all prisoners held in a certain jail,
because the consent decree referred to “inmates” and “residents.”161 In addition, although
they were not specifically named in the consent decree, the court found that all 300
prisoners held in the jail were within the class of intended beneficiaries.162
In another case, a district court in New York held that garment workers who were
not specifically identified in an agreement between a clothing manufacturer and the
Department of Labor could, nevertheless, enforce the agreement as third party
beneficiaries.163 The court found that the contract evidenced an intent-to-benefit the
workers who were not even employees of the clothing manufacturer, but rather were
employees of another company with whom the clothing manufacturer had contracted.164
The court found that the parties intended to benefit the workers because the contract with
the Department of Labor required that the clothing manufacturer not only pay minimum
wages to its own workers, but that it not outsource any work to companies who do not
160

Id. (“Where the third-person beneficiary is so described as to be ascertainable, it is not necessary that he
or she be named in the contract in order to recover thereon. Indeed he or she may be one of a class of
persons, if the class is sufficiently described or designated.”).
161
Hook, et. al., v. State of Arizona, Department of Corrections, 972 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“decree lists ‘inmates’ and ‘residents’ as the intended beneficiaries of the consent decree. Thus, the 265
inmates are intended third party beneficiaries that have standing to enforce the rights of the inmates under
the consent decree”).
162
Id.
163
Chen, et. al., v. Street Beat Sportswear, et. al., 226 F.Supp.2d 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
164
Id. at 357-58.
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pay their workers minimum wages and overtime.165 The garment workers were within
the class of intended beneficiaries because they were employees of a company to whom
the defendant outsourced its work.166 Consequently, in order for a treaty to give rise to
individually enforceable rights, it must be deemed to benefit a class of individuals and the
third party claiming rights under the treaty must be found to be within such class of
individuals.
2. Consulting Extra-Textual Sources
In determining whether the parties intended to benefit a class of individuals, the
intentionalist theory underlying the intent to benefit test counsels that courts should look
not only to the written words of the treaty, but also to extrinsic materials.167 Indeed,
Section 302(b) of the Restatement Second specifically states that courts should look to
the “circumstances” surrounding a contract.168 As discussed in Section II above, courts
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Id. at 363 (“Based on the language of the agreement itself, it is strikingly obvious that the entire purpose
of the ACPA is to ensure that employees of factories which contract with Street Beat are paid minimum
wage and overtime, and that it was they who were directly intended to be benefited.”). See also Klamath
Irrigation District, et. al. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 504 (Fed Cl. 2005) (finding that irrigators were third
party beneficiaries of contracts between the United States and certain water districts because contracts
expressed intent of the relevant district and the United States to benefit irrigators directly by having the
district assume the primary responsibility for providing water within the district in exchange for collecting
amounts owed by the irrigator in payment for their water).
166
Id.
167
See e.g., Movesesian, supra note 93, at 1162. See also Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 940 (11th
Cir.1983) (“[W]hen determining whether the parties to the contract intended to bestow a benefit on a third
party, a court may look beyond the contract to the circumstances surrounding its formation.”); Southridge
Capital Management, LLC v. Lowry, 188 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (determining third party
beneficiary status under New York law, it is permissible for the court to look at the surrounding
circumstances as well as the agreement).
168
Second Restatement, supra note 65, at § 302. On the other hand, Movesesian argues that consulting
extra-textual sources to determine the intent of the parties to a contract could be detrimental to a third party
who might be bound by terms that he or she never consented to. Movesesian, supra note 93, at 1174. The
concern raised by Movesesian would be applicable in only one very limited circumstance – when the
parties to a contract colluded to deceive the third party by writing favorable provisions in the contract in
favor of the beneficiary, but their true intent was to provide the third party with no benefit. This situation is
not likely to occur often. In addition, parties to a contract would fail in an attempt to refer to extrinsic
material that might directly contradict the text of a contract. Finally, other doctrines, such as those
requiring good faith and clean hands, would probably prevent the parties from arguing that their true intent
of deceiving the third party should govern to deny the third party any benefit.
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do consult with extra-textual sources for purposes of treaty interpretation, 169 but they
have not followed any “principled ways to choose among extra-textual materials.”170 The
intent-to-benefit test suggests that courts focus on the intent of the parties who drafted the
treaty. Consequently, courts should consult with sources such as the travaux
préparatoires, also known as the drafting history or the negotiating history, of a treaty171
because it reveals the shared intent of the parties to the treaty. 172
On the other hand, courts should not give any weight to the domestic ratification
history of a treaty because it reflects either the intent of a non-party (the Senate) or the
intent of just one party to the treaty (the Executive).173 As Justice Scalia pointed out in
Stuart,174 the question is “what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what a
single one of them, or the legislature of a single one of them, thought it agreed to. And to
169

See e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 383 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In the area of statutory construction, it is the
intent of Congress that governs whether a private action exists); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,
516 U.S. 217, 226 (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, but also
an agreement among sovereign powers, [this Court has] traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation
the negotiating and drafting history . . . and the postratification understanding of the contracting parties.”).
See also Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, p. 160 (2003)
(noting that in interpreting a treaty, “a US court follows a similar approach to that which it adopts for the
interpretation of legislation, where ‘legislative history’ may be examined in depth”).
170
David Bederman, CLASSICAL CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 267-68
(Ashgate 2001) [hereinafter “Classical Canons”].
171
Jonathan Pratter, À la Recherche des Travaux Préparatoires: An Approach to Researching the Drafting
History of International Agreements, Dec 2005., available at
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Travaux_Preparatoires.htm
172
Alstine justifies the use of drafting history on four alternate grounds that are consistent with my
conclusion. Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, supra note 58, at 744-748. First, it helps to create a
uniform international interpretation, because courts in other countries can also consult the drafting history
of a treaty. Id. at 744-45. Second, treaties are negotiated by representatives of the Executive so concerns
about unconstitutional “self-delegation” on the part of Congress are not relevant. Id. at 745-46. Third, the
argument advanced by textualists that refusing to consult extra-textual sources enhances democracy by
disciplining Congress to draft more carefully and be more diligent in amending outdated legislation is not
applicable because once a multilateral treaty is effective it is almost impossible to amend. Id. at 746.
Finally, drafting history is increasingly important because of the indeterminacy of international standards
and the difficulty in amending a treaty. Id. at 747.
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The principles suggested in this article apply to the interpretation of treaties and not necessarily to
interpreting the legislation implementing treaties. For example, in the Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123
(2005), it may have been appropriate for the court to consult with ratification history of the treaty to
determine the meaning of the federal statute and regulations implementing the treaty. Auguste v. Ridge,
395 F.3d at 130-134.
174
U.S. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
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answer that question accurately, it can reasonably be said, whatever extra-textual
materials are consulted must be materials that reflect the mutual agreement (for example,
the negotiating history) rather than a unilateral understanding.”175 At first blush Justice
Scalia’s position in Stuart might seem to contradict his theory of textualism, but no such
contradiction exists. Although Justice Scalia rallied against the use of domestic
ratification history he did not advocate the use of any other extra-textual sources for
determining the meaning of the treaty in question.176
Constitutional arguments also support the view that courts should not consult with
domestic ratification history in interpreting the meaning of a treaty. Giving credence to
what the Senators of the ratifying Congress thought a treaty meant is akin to allowing the
Senators to amend the meaning of a treaty. Even though Section 2 of Article II of the
Constitution gives the Senate the power to provide “advice and consent” to the President
in ratifying a treaty, it does not give the Senate the unilateral right to change the terms or
meaning of a treaty. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in the Diamond Rings case, Justice
Brown made the point that a treaty cannot be amended simply by a resolution adopted by
Congress.177
Commentators have also critiqued courts for determining the meaning of a treaty
based on Senate interpretations. In a challenge to the dual approach to treaty
interpretation, John Norton Moore argues that “the Senate does not have an independent
lawmaking power to attach ‘domestic conditions’ to treaties during the advice and
175

Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
Id.
177
The Diamond Rings Case, 183 U.S., at 182-83 (1901) (“To be efficacious such resolution must be
considered either (1) as an amendment to the treaty, or (2) as a legislative act qualifying or modifying the
treaty. It is neither. It cannot be regarded as part of the treaty, since it received neither the approval of the
President nor the consent of the other contracting power. . . . The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty and
introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other power, although it may refuse its
ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of amendments to the treaty.”).
176
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consent process.”178 He also believes that “non self-executing declarations” are a
suspect domestic condition under modern constitutional law.179 In proving his point,
Moore argues that courts have never consulted Senate materials to determine the intent of
the Senate, but should only consult those materials to “ascertain the intent of the parties
or the views of the President.”180 Thus, he argues that it is appropriate for a court to
consider the President’s transmittal message to the Senate or its accompanying
documents in interpreting the meaning of a treaty.181
While I agree with Moore that Senate conditions during the “advice and consent”
process should not impact the interpretation of a treaty, I part ways with him on the view
that courts should consider unilateral statements made by the President to Congress in
interpreting treaties. The meaning of a treaty must be determined by the shared intent of
the parties, and not the intent of one of the parties. It is not fair to expect every signatory
of a treaty to monitor all domestic ratification processes to ensure that other parties do not
put forth interpretations that are contrary to the shared intent of the parties. Moreover,
Executives have many political reasons to distort the meaning of a treaty during the
ratification process—first, they may make statements that are more likely to convince the
Senate to ratify the treaty, and second, they might spin the meaning on a treaty that is
more advantageous to them at a time when they know that the other parties do not have
an opportunity to object.182
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John Norton Moore, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF Law 108 (2001).
Id. at 109.
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Id. at 151.
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But see Glashausser, supra note 105, at 1275 (arguing that that domestic ratification history is an
appropriate source for determining a treaty’s meaning because a treaty is not considered binding for
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Finally, another question that is important to address is what (if any) level of
ambiguity justifies consulting extrinsic sources to determine the intent of the parties
under the intent-to-benefit test. Some courts that apply textualist approaches refuse to
consult with extra-textual sources under any circumstances, while others require a high
level of ambiguity in the text.183 On the middle of the spectrum are those who follow the
Treaty Convention approach, which suggests consulting with extra-textual sources more
readily than textualists, but still requires a relatively high level of ambiguity.184
However, the intent-to-benefit test suggests that extra-textual sources may be consulted
even if the text is not ambiguous.185
3.

Intent in Multi-party Contracts

Determining the intent of parties to a contract is difficult, but it is even more
difficult in multi-party contracts. This endeavor is further complicated by the fact that
the intent-to-benefit test in the Second Restatement does not clarify whose intent should
govern—the intent of the promisor, the intent of the promisee or the mutual intent of the
parties.186 David Summers’ proposes that a party should be considered an intended
beneficiary as long as the promisee intended to benefit such third party and the promisor
assented.187 Summers proposal can be broadened to apply to multilateral treaties -- the
“intent” requirement of the intent-to-benefit test would be satisfied so long as one
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See discussion supra Section I.
See discussion supra Section II.
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See discussion supra Section III.
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Summers, supra note 83, at 894-96 (“The Restatement Second . . . may, in fact, add to the confusion. It
does not clearly indicate whether the promisee’s intention alone should govern, or whether courts must
require the intention of both the promisor and the promisee before the third party is an ‘intended’
beneficiary. The confusion stems from ambiguity in the language of section 302. In its two-part test for
determining when a third party is an ‘intended beneficiary,’ section 302(1) refers to the ‘intention of the
parties’ under its first requirement, but only to the promisee's intention under subsection b of its second
requirement.”).
187
Id. at 897.
184

37

signatory to the treaty indicated an intent to benefit a third party (or class of third parties)
and other parties assented (including by means of failing to raise an objection during the
drafting convention).
Based on the discussion above, the intent-to-benefit test, adopted for purposes of
determining whether a treaty gives an individual the right to enforce it, is as follows:188
1)

Does the treaty identify a class of individuals who are intended
beneficiaries of the treaty?
a.

2)
B.

Extra-textual sources may be consulted in answering the
question regardless of whether the text of the treaty is
ambiguous.
1. Courts may refer to extra-textual sources such as the
drafting history of the treaty.
2. Courts should not, however, consult statements made
by Senators during the ratification of the treaty and
representations made by the Executive to the Senate
during such process.
b. If one party made a statement during the drafting process of the
treaty, which was not refuted by another party that statement
should be considered the intent of all of the parties for purposes
of determining the meaning of a treaty.

Is the individual within the class of people that the parties intended to
benefit?
The Modified Intent-to-Benefit Test and the Sanchez-Llamas Case

The modified intent-to-benefit test set forth above suggests the petitioners the
Consular Convention gives petitioners individually enforceable rights. Although the text
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Before courts determine whether treaties give rise to individually enforceable rights, they typically
determine whether a treaty is self-executing or not. See e.g., Medallion; Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126
S.Ct. 2669 (2006); Foreign Relations Restatement, supra note 1, at § 111 cmt. (h) (1987). In ratifying a
number of human rights treaties Congress adopted a resolution that indicating that the treaties are not “selfexecuting”. See e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self Executing
Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale Journal of International Law 129, 131-32 (1999). Some
have argued that this principle may be unconstitutional, but I do not engage that debate here. See e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 760, 760 (1988) (arguing that the distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause). The
methodology proposed herein would only be applied to a treaty once it has been determined to be selfexecuting.

38

of the Consular Convention is arguably ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to
benefit individuals, reference to the appropriate extra-textual sources suggests that the
parties to the treaty intended to benefit a certain class of individuals--citizens of one party
to the Consular Convention who were detained by the national government of another
party to the Consular Convention. Both petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, were
within that class of citizens.
Article 36 of the Consular Convention identifies a class of individuals that is to
benefit from the Consular Convention--individuals of one nation detained by authorities
of another national government. Article 36 states that “if he so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”189
In addition to requiring a detaining authority to notify the national government of the
detainee if the detainee so requests, the Consular Convention places an affirmative
obligation on the detaining authority to notify the detainee of his “rights” under the
Consular Convention. Article 36(1)(b) further states that “[t]he said authorities shall
inform the person concerned [i.e., the detainee] without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.”190
Several courts have found that the language of Article 36 of the Consular
Convention creates individually enforceable rights.191 On the other hand, other courts
have noted that language of the preamble of the Consular Convention, which states that
the “purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
189

See Consular Convention, supra note 62 , art. 36(1)(b).
Id.
191
See supra note 149.
190
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the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective
States,” weighs against concluding that the Consular Convention was meant to benefit
individuals. 192 Although the intent-to-benefit test does not require any ambiguity in the
meaning of the relevant treaty provisions before consulting with extra-textual sources,
referring to extra-textual sources is even more compelling when there is ambiguity.
However, the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas refused to consult with extra-textual
sources in determining whether the Consular Convention provided for any remedies.
The drafting history and the committee and plenary debates193 surrounding the
adoption of Article 36 demonstrate the intent of the delegates to protect the rights of
individuals. 194 The negotiators at the conference extensively discussed the rights of
foreign nationals.195 The delegate to the United Kingdom objected to the proposal that a
consul be notified only if the detained national so requested, because “it could well make
the provisions of Article 36 ineffective because the person arrested might not be aware of
his rights.”196 The Australian delegate stated that “there was no need to stress the extreme
importance of not disregarding, in the present or any other international document, the
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See generally Wooster, Construction and Application of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR), Requiring that Foreign Consulate be Notified When One of its Nationals is Arrested, 175 A.L.R.
Fed. 243, 2002 WL 181172 (2002) (collecting federal cases).
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The Consular Convention was the product of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations,
held in Vienna from March 4 through April 22, 1963. At the conference, representatives of the
governments of 92 nations met to negotiate the Convention, a proposed draft of which had been prepared
by the International Law Commission.
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At least one other author has argued that the Consular Convention should be interpreted to give rise to
individually enforceable rights principally because of its drafting history, but did not provide a contract law
methodology to justify his conclusion. See e.g., Brittany P. Whitesell, Note, Diamond in the Rough: Mining
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587 Duke Law Journal (2004) (“As a self-executing treaty, the Vienna Convention is capable of granting
individual rights, and the treaty’s language and drafting history indicate that it does so. The treaty explicitly
references an individual, and the drafting history indicates that the drafters intended to vest an individual
right in foreign nationals.”).
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See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
25/6, U.N. Sales. No.63.X.2 (1963);
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Id. at 83-84; see also id. at 339, 344.
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rights of the individual.”197 In fact, the U.S. delegate proposed an amendment to Article
36(1)(b) requiring consular notification to be made at the request of the national, “to
protect the rights of the national concerned.”198 The United Kingdom submitted the
amendment that became the final version of paragraph (b)(1), requiring the detaining
nation to inform the detained foreign national of his right to consular access. The United
States delegate voted with the majority in favor of the amendment.199
Although the Conference extensively debated various terms of Article 36, the
view that its language operated to confer rights on individual foreign nationals was
widely voiced by delegates and that view went unchallenged. For example, Spain’s
delegate observed that “[t]he right of the nationals of a sending State to communicate
with and have access to the consulate and consular officials of their own country ... [i]s
one of the most sacred rights of foreign residents in a country.”200 The delegate from
India emphasized that “the right given to consulates implied a corresponding right for
nationals.”201 The South Korean delegate stated that “the receiving State’s obligation
under [Article 36(1)(b)] was extremely important, because it related to one of the
fundamental and indispensable rights of the individual.”202 Consequently, the drafting
history suggests that the treaty signatories intended to benefit a certain class of
individuals. Both petitioners were within that class of individuals—citizens of foreign
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nations who are party to the Consular Convention and were detained in the United States
by the United States government.203
Conclusion
This article provides a methodology for adjudicating an issue that has been
increasingly raised in U.S. courts—does a treaty give rise to individually enforceable
rights. This question, at least with respect to the Consular Convention, was left
unresolved by the Supreme Court when it had the opportunity to do so last term in
Sanchez-Lllamas. The Supreme Court’s failure to provide guidance has allowed courts to
reach differing conclusions on the issue. This article attempts to provide a predictable
set of guidelines for courts.
I argue that in determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable
rights, courts should apply a modified version of the intent-to-benefit test from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Courts have tended to import principles of statutory
interpretation in determining individually enforceable rights under treaties. However,
because treaties are more similar to contracts than statutes, it is more appropriate to apply
contract principles in determining the meaning of a treaty. Conceiving of treaties as
contracts also finds support in the text of the Constitution and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The traditional justifications offered to support textualism in the context
203

On the other hand, the respondents argued that the drafting history does not give rise to individually
enforceable rights, because no delegate ever mentioned that individuals would have the right to raise it as a
defense in a domestic criminal proceeding. In reliance on statutory interpretation models, the respondents
framed the question incorrectly—the correct question is whether the drafting history indicates an intent-tobenefit certain individuals not whether the signatories intended to given individuals enforceable rights
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of implying private rights of action in statutes do not translate into the treaty
interpretation context. Consequently, the theory underlying modern statutory
interpretation, textualism, should be rejected in favor of the theory guiding the intent-tobenefit test—intentionalism.
Application of the intent-to-benefit test is more likely to lead courts to rule in
favor of individually enforceable rights than the current statutory approach, because it
allows courts to consider sources other than the text of the treaty. Treaties that negotiate
the relationships between the individuals and nations, such as human rights treaties and
humanitarian law treaties, are more likely to give rise to individually enforceable rights
under the approach suggested by this article, because the signatories often manifest an
intent to benefit individuals.
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